Restrain and Hedge: A New U.S. Nuclear Strategy for a Two-Peer World

What if fielding more nuclear weapons makes the United States less secure, not more? That question is now at the center of a growing debate as the United States confronts a nuclear landscape shaped by two major nuclear rivals. China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, while the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the last remaining nuclear arms control deal between the United States and Russia, has expired .

In what appears as the beginning of a new, more dangerous nuclear age , some analysts believe the United States should increase the size of its deployed nuclear arsenal . Others believe that increasing the number of warheads on existing launchers is unnecessary and will prompt a new nuclear arms race. While deploying more nuclear warheads is tempting in the short term, it is strategically flawed. It would provide the United States a marginal deterrent benefit while further fueling a trilateral nuclear arms race for which Washington is ill-prepared. Instead, the United States should exercise nuclear self-restraint. This means deemphasizing damage limitation within its nuclear strategy while pursuing a new nuclear arms control framework with both Russia and China. To hedge against the possibility that those two countries fail to exhibit similar restraint and are not amenable to striking a deal, the United States should improve its capacity to refurbish existing nuclear warheads, produce new ones, and manufacture nuclear platforms such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic ballistic missile submarines. This approach offers the chance of putting a lid on an emerging trilateral nuclear arms race while also preparing the United States to participate in it should it prove unavoidable. The first element of a more restrained U.S. nuclear strategy is to deemphasize damage limitation as an operational objective. Taking this step would avoid intensifying a nuclear arms race for which the United States is ill-prepared and free it from needing to target every nuclear asset of China and Russia. Deemphasizing damage limitation would not require the United States to radically adjust its targeting policy towards countervalue strikes against cities and civilian infrastructure.

Key points

• In what appears as the beginning of a new, more dangerous nuclear age , some analysts believe the United States should increase the size of its deployed nuclear arsenal .
• Others believe that increasing the number of warheads on existing launchers is unnecessary and will prompt a new nuclear arms race.
• While deploying more nuclear warheads is tempting in the short term, it is strategically flawed.
• It would provide the United States a marginal deterrent benefit while further fueling a trilateral nuclear arms race for which Washington is ill-prepared.
• Instead, the United States should exercise nuclear self-restraint.