The Operational Case Against Israel’s Gaza Campaign

Gaza did not have to look the way it looks. Claims of necessity are invoked to explain the scale of civilian harm, but they founder in the face of operational logic. Supporters of Israeli methods argue that Gaza’s urban battlefield — tunnels, rocket fire, extreme population density, hostages held underground — left no viable alternative to large-scale destruction.

That argument rests on a false assumption: that large-scale fires were inevitable rather than chosen, and that the only tradeoff was between more fires and mission failure. That is a false choice, and I’ll explain why. I have planned and fought in urban operations, where the tension between necessity and mission is real. Not only were better alternatives available, but the methods employed in Gaza actively reduced Israel’s chances of achieving its stated objectives: recovering hostages and dismantling Hamas. The same conditions cited to justify large-scale destruction are precisely the conditions that make discrimination, separation, and intelligence-driven operations necessary. My argument builds on a previous article published in these pages and responds directly to the critics who challenged it. In international humanitarian law, military necessity permits measures essential to achieve a legitimate military purpose. But the standard does not ask how much force can be applied. It asks which methods are required to accomplish the mission. It is a comparative standard: whether the means chosen were necessary to achieve the objective, and whether feasible, less harmful alternatives were available. The question is therefore whether the scale and method of force employed in Gaza were required to achieve Israel’s stated objectives. The claim that military necessity compelled the approach used does not hold, and the most direct way to demonstrate that is to examine the objective most often described as paramount: the recovery of the hostages.

Key points

• That argument rests on a false assumption: that large-scale fires were inevitable rather than chosen, and that the only tradeoff was between more fires and mission failure.
• That is a false choice, and I’ll explain why.
• I have planned and fought in urban operations, where the tension between necessity and mission is real.
• Not only were better alternatives available, but the methods employed in Gaza actively reduced Israel’s chances of achieving its stated objectives: recovering hostages and dismantling Hamas.
• The same conditions cited to justify large-scale destruction are precisely the conditions that make discrimination, separation, and intelligence-driven operations necessary.