Matthew Fuhrmann discusses the conditions required for countries to gain geopolitical leverage through latent nuclear capabilities without building weapons.

In a follow-up to his 2025 analysis, Matthew Fuhrmann examines the effectiveness of latent nuclear deterrence, a strategy where countries leverage the potential to build nuclear weapons without actually doing so. Fuhrmann identifies three conditions necessary for this strategy to succeed: the technical capacity to produce fissile material, the ability to reassure the international community that they are not currently arming, and the presence of high stakes to ensure threats remain credible.

Conditions for Success

According to Fuhrmann, the primary requirement for latent deterrence is the possession of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Beyond technical capability, a country must successfully convince foreign observers that it is not actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Finally, the strategy requires high stakes, which are essential for making the threat of future nuclear development or use believable to adversaries.

Countries Well-Positioned for Latent Deterrence

Fuhrmann maintains that Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan remain the best-positioned nations to utilize this strategy. These countries possess the technical means to produce fissile material, making it clear to the international community that they could develop a nuclear weapon quickly if they chose to. Simultaneously, there is little belief among foreign observers that these nations are currently operating clandestine nuclear weapons programs, which enhances the credibility of their potential threats.