Jul 31, 2026
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War & Conflicts

Researchers used a wargame called Tantalus to study whether deterrent threats can effectively prevent cyber operations, finding that states may be underutilizing deterrence in cyberspace.

ManyPress

ManyPress

ManyPress Editorial

3 min readSource:War on the Rocks
Wargaming Research Suggests Cyber Operations Can Be Deterred

Key facts

  • The Tantalus wargame involved 394 games and 1,090 players to study decision-making in security contexts.
  • Researchers found that cyber operations are just as susceptible to deterrence as conventional kinetic attacks.
  • Cyber threats were found to be less effective than nuclear threats when used as a form of punishment.
  • Players in the study were less likely to issue deterrent threats when facing potential cyber operations compared to kinetic threats.
  • The study suggests that current cyber strategies may be underutilizing deterrence as a tool for preventing attacks.

Researchers have utilized a wargame called Tantalus to address the difficulty of observing successful deterrence in international security. By separating action selection from execution, the game allowed participants to change their minds after receiving deterrent threats. This methodology provided a way to measure deterrence, which is typically unobservable in real-world scenarios.

By the numbers

394
number of games played in the study
1,090
number of players involved in the study

Methodology and Data Collection

The Tantalus wargame was designed to create a window between a player's planned action and its execution, allowing researchers to observe when a player chooses to stand down due to a threat. Across 394 games involving 1,090 players, the study captured data on what players would have done in the absence of a deterrent threat. This approach aims to provide empirical insights into complex security problems where real-world data is scarce.

Findings on Cyber Deterrence

The study distinguished between two definitions of cyber deterrence. When defining it as using cyber threats to punish an adversary, the research found such threats to be less effective than nuclear threats. However, when defining it as deterring a cyber operation through any form of punishment, the results indicated that cyber operations can be deterred. Players were found to be just as likely to be deterred from a cyber attack as they were from a conventional kinetic attack.

Policy Implications

Despite evidence that deterrent threats can be effective against cyber operations, the study observed that players reached for such threats far less often when facing potential cyber attacks compared to kinetic ones. The researchers suggest that states may be treating cyber operations as inevitable, thereby missing opportunities to prevent them. The findings indicate that deterrence could play a more prominent role in cyber strategy than is currently practiced.

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This article was independently rewritten by ManyPress editorial AI from reporting originally published by War on the Rocks.

War & Conflicts